ACT-UTILITARIANISM AND RULE-UTILITARIANISM

ACT-UTILITARIANISM AND RULE-UTILITARIANISM


Introduction
A system of ethics which is free from traditional and theological associations is a type of utilitarianism which R. B. Brandt has called ‘act-utilitarianism’. Roughly speaking act- utilitarianism is the view that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends only on the total goodness or badness of its consequences, that is, on the effect of the action on the welfare of all human beings. Act-utilitarianism is to be contrasted with rule-utilitarianism. According to David Lyons rule-utilitarianism collapses into act-utilitarianism. Here these two arguments are taken to analyse and also deal the place of rules in act-utilitarianism.

Act-utilitarianism and Rule-utilitarianism
Act-utilitarianism is to be contrasted with rule-utilitarianism. Act- utilitarianism is the view that the rightness or wrongness of an action is to be judged by the consequences, good or bad, of the action itself. Rule- utilitarianism is the view that the rightness or wrongness of an action is to be judged by the goodness and badness of the consequences of a rule that everyone should perform the action in like circumstances. There are two sub-varieties of rule-utilitarianism according to whether one construes rule here as actual rule or possible rule. With the former, one gets a view like that of S. E. Toulmin and with the latter, one like Kant’s. That is, if it is permissible to interpret Kant’s principle ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ as ‘Act only on that maxim which you as a humane and benevolent person would like to see established as a universal law’. Of course Kant would resist this appeal to human feeling, but it seems necessary in order to interpret his doctrine in a plausible way. The rule-utilitarian presumably advocates his principle because he is ultimately concerned with human happiness.
David Lyons has recently argued that rule-utilitarianism collapses into act-utilitarianism. His reasons are briefly as follows. Suppose that an exception to a rule A produces the best possible consequences. Then this is evidens that the rule A should be modified so as to allow this exception. Thus we get a new rule of the form ‘do A except in circumstances of the sort B’.That is, whatever would lead the act-utilitarian to break a rule would lead the Kantian rule-utilitarian to modify the rule. Thus an adequate rule-utilitarianism would be extensionally equivallent to act-utilitarianism.
An adequate rule-utilitarianism would not only be extensionally equivallent to the act-utilitarian principle but would in fact consist of one rule only, the act-utilitarian one: ‘maximize probable benefit’. This is because any rule which can be formulated must be able to deal with an indefinite number of unforseen types of contingency. No rule, short of the act-utilitarian one, can therefore be safely regarded as extensionally equivallent to the act-utilitarian principle unless it is that very principle itself.

The Place of Rules in Act-utilitarianism
According to the act-utilitarian, then, the rational way to decide what to do is to decide to perform that one of those alternative actions open to us which is likely to maximize the probable happiness or well-being of humanity as a whole, or more accurately, of all sentient beings. The utilitarian position is here put forward as a criterion of rational choice. It is true that we may choose to habituate ourselves to behave in accordance with certain rules, such as to keep promises, in the belief that bahaving in accordance with these rules is generally optimific, and in the knowledge that we most often just do not have time to work out individual pros and cons. When we act in such a habitual fashion we do not of course deliberate or make a choice. The act-utilitarian will, however regard these rules as mere rules of thumb, and will use them only as rough guides. Normally he will act in accordance with them when he has no time for considering probable cosequences or when the advantages of such a consideration of consequences are likely to be outweighed by the disadvantage of the waste of time involved. He acts in accordance with rules, in short, when there is no time to think, and since he does not think, the actions which he does habitually are not the outcome of moral thinking. When he has to think what to do, then there is a question of deliberation or choice, and it is precisely for such situations that the utilitarian criterion is intended. It is moreover important to realize that there is no inconsistency whatever in an act-utilitarian’s schooling himself to act in normal circumstances habitually and in accordance with stereotyped rules.
Act-utilitarianism is meant to give a method of deciding what to do in those cases in which we do indeed decide what to do. On these occasions when we do not act as a result of deliberation and choice, that is, when we act spontaneously no method of decision whether utilitarian or non-utilitarian comes into the matter. What does arise for the utilitarian is the question of whether or not he should consciously encourage in himself the tendency to certain types of spontaneous feeling. There are in fact very good utilitarian reasons why we should by all means cultivate in ourselves the tendency to certain types of warm and spontaneous feeling. Though even the act-utilitarian may on occasion act habitually and in accordance with particular rules, his criterion is, applied in cases in which he does not act habitually but in which he deliberates and chooses what to do. Now the right action for agent in given circumstances is the action which produces better results than any alternative action.
We are now able to specify more clearly what is meant by alternative action. The fact that the utilitarian criterion is meant to apply in situations of deliberation and choice enables us to say that the class of alternative actions which we have in mind when we talk about an action having the best possible results is the class of actions which the agent could have performed if he had tried.
It is true that the general concept of action is wider than that of deliberate choice. Many actions are performed habitually and without deliberation. But the actions for whose rightness we as agents want a criterion are, in the nature of the case those done thinkingly and deliberately. An action is at any rate that sort of human performance which it is appropriate to praise, blame, punish or reward, and since it is often appropriate to praise, blame, punish or reward habitual performances the concept of action cannot be identified with that of the outcome of deliberation and choice. The utilitarian criterion then is designed to help a person who could do various things if he chose to do them to decide which of these things he should do. His utilitarian deliberation is one of the causal antecedents of his action and it would be pointless if it were not. The utilitarian view is therefore perfectly compatible with determinism.
The utilitarian conveniently make a terminological recommendation. Let us use the word rational as a term of commendation for that action which is on the evidence available to the agent likely to produce the best results, and to reserve the word right as a term of commendation for the action which does in fact produce the best results. That is, let us say that what is rational is to try to perform the right action to try to produce the best results. Or at least this formulation will do where there is an equal probability of achieving each possible set of results. If there is a low probability of producing very good results, then it is natural to say that the rational agent would perhaps go for other more probable though not quite so good results. For a more accurate formulation we should have to weight the goodness of the results with their probabilities. However neglecting this complication we can say roughly that it is rational to perform the action which is on the available evidence the one which will produce the best results.
Ratonal and irrational and right and wrong so far have been introduced as terms of appraisal for chosen or deliberate actions only. There is no reason why we should not use the pair of terms right and wrong more widely so as to appraise even habitual actions. Nevertheless we shall not have much occasion to appraise actions that are not the outcome of choice. What we do need is a pair of terms of appraisal for agents and motives. We use the terms good and bad for these purposes. A good agent is one who acts more nearly in a generally optimific way than does the average one. A bad agent is one who acts in a less optimific way than the average. A good motive is one which generally results in beneficent actions, and a bad motive is one which generally ends in maleficent actions. Clearly there is no inconsistency in saying that on a particular occasion a good man did a wrong action, that a bad man did a right action, that a right action was done from a bad motive, or that a wrong action was done from a good motive. Many specious arguments against utilitarianism come from obscuring these distinctions. Thus one may be got to admit that an action is right, meaning no more than that it is done from a good motive and is praiseworthy and then it is pointed out that the action is not right in the sense of being optimific.

Conclusion
Utilitarianism is a normative system. The fact that it has consequences which conflict with some of our particular moral judgements need not be decisive against it. In science general principles must be tested by reference to particular facts of observation. In ethics we may well take the opposite attitude and test our particular moral attitudes by reference to more general ones. The utilitarian can contend that since his principle rests on something so simple and natural as generalized benevolence it is more securely founded than our particular feelings, which may be subtly distored by analogies with similar looking types of cases, and by all sorts of hangovers from traditional and uncritical ethical thinking.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Smart, J. J. C. Utilitarianism For and Against. London: Cambridge University
Press,1973
Brandt, R. B. Ethical Theory. New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs, 1959.
Toulmin, stephen. An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics. London:
Cambridge University Press, 1950.
Immanuel, Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton.
London: Hutchinson, 1948.
Lyons, david. The Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism. London: Oxford University
Press, 1965.